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Chapter 7
Patent Law’s Problem Children:
Software and Biotechnology in Transatlantic Context
Dan L. Burk*

INTRODUCTION
Modern patent law applies across a vast range of developed, developing, and as yet
undeveloped technologies. Indeed, the international TRIPS Agreement requires that, with
only a few exceptions, patent protection is to be available in signatory nations without
respect to technological field.1 At the same time, modern technologies display a highly
varied and even disparate set of technical features, economic characteristics, and
innovation profiles.2 In order to accommodate this diverse array of technologies, patent
statutes incorporate flexible provisions allowing their application to be modulated to the
needs of different subject matter categories.3
And yet, even with such statutory flexibility, some technologies fit only very
uncomfortably within the ambit of current patent statutes. In particular, recombinant
DNA technology and computer software have long been the problem children of modern
patent law.4 For at least the last thirty years, on both sides of the Atlantic, patent doctrine
has been in a constant state of turmoil regarding these technologies, sometimes accepting
them, sometimes rejecting them, and almost continually revising itself in unsuccessful
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attempts to accommodate them. This difficulty has been apparent across multiple patent
doctrines, including disclosure, obviousness, and utility.
But perhaps the most pronounced difficulties have manifested in attempting to fit
inventions from these high technology fields reliably, if at all, within the subject matter
provisions of American and European patent law. Despite a lengthy period of
consideration and reconsideration, patent authorities in these major jurisdictions have
generally failed to settle on a solution to the subject matter problems concerning software
and biotechnology inventions. The law on this question remains in constant flux,
attempting new formulation every few years, leaving the industries founded on these
technologies uncertain as to the criteria for patentability in their fields. No stable
resolution to these issues is currently in sight.
However, it may be that the extended effort that has gone into considering the
problem has not been entirely in vain, even if no firm criteria for determining software
and biotechnology subject matter have yet emerged. Instead, what arguably has emerged
from thirty years of judicial, legislative, and administrative struggle is the outline of the
problem that bedevils these technologies. This outline is apparent in examining the
common threads running not only between decisions regarding these two technologies,
but among the law developed by adjudicators in different jurisdictions. A comparative
study of such decisions shows that such institutions have consistently relied upon a
similar pattern of doctrines, interpretive strategies, and jurisprudential constructs in their
attempts to accommodate software and biotechnological developments within patentable
subject matter.
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In tracing the skein of such decisions we must of course be aware of certain
differences in the contexts of the various decisions regarding patentable subject matter.
Much of the development of this law in North America has been common law
development, generated in the courts, either by judicial interpretation of statutes, or from
entirely judicially created doctrine. The United States Patent Office in particular, has a
relatively subordinate role in developing the meaning of the patent statute. In Europe,
only Great Britain follows the common law approach; other national courts are largely
creatures of civil law.
Perhaps more important, much of European patent law development emerges
from the intersection of national laws and interpretation of international treaties. The
European Patent Office is a treaty organization, with quasi-judicial functions in
interpreting the language of the European Patent Convention. Separately and
contiguously, the Court of Justice of the European Union, a different treaty organization,
assumes responsibility for interpreting the language of European Union directives, as
well as the compatibility of national laws with the functioning of a common market under
the relevant community treaties. The language of certain directives has a bearing on the
development of patent laws, whereas the functioning of national patent laws has a bearing
on the common market. The interpretive latitude of such bodies is markedly different
than that of common law courts.
Additionally, it is important in such comparisons to recognize that these
treatments of patent law do not develop in isolation. Judges and patent examiners on both
sides of the Atlantic are well aware of the decisions of their counterparts elsewhere; they
are in frequent communication and familiar with doctrinal developments in other
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jurisdictions.5 International treaties lend a measure of harmonization to the patent regime
in different jurisdictions, or may impose constraints channeling local developments along
similar courses. Consequently, to the extent that similar patterns of addressing patent
issues constitute parallel development, it is often conscious parallelism rather than an
independent convergence.
Nonetheless, even bearing such caveats in mind, tracing particular patterns across
jurisdictions can help us triangulate on core issues that exist despite disparate institutional
and jurisprudential contexts. In examining similar fact patterns from different
jurisdictions, I will highlight common approaches to common problems, which I will
argue reveal a fundamental deficiency to be corrected in modern patent law.

I. CATEGORIZING SUBJECT MATTER
Perhaps the best place to begin tracing the commonalities of treatment in biotechnology
and software patenting is in North America, with the landmark decision of the Canadian
Supreme Court in Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents).6 The invention
at issue in the decision was the so-called “Oncomouse,” a genetically modified rodent
carrying genetic sequences, called oncogenes, that confer on the animal a greater
susceptibility to cancer, making it a valuable laboratory model for biomedical research.
The mouse was the subject of a lengthy patent battle in the European Patent Office; was
celebrated in the United States as one of the first patents on a genetically modified
animal; and was the subject of a patent rejection in the Canadian Patent Office, which
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contended that such living subject matter was not within the scope of the Canadian patent
statute.
That decision was upheld by the Canadian Supreme Court. Over a vigorous
dissent, the majority of the Court in Harvard College accepted the position of the patent
office, holding that a living organism was not within the meaning of the subject matter
provisions of the patent statute. The Canadian patent statute defines patentable subject
matter as “any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.”7 The Court concluded that a living, “higher” organism could not fit the definition
for any of these categories. In particular, the majority held that the mouse could not be a
“composition of matter” under the statute, reasoning that the ordinary meaning of this
term included only inanimate material, not living organisms, or at least, not “higher”
organisms such as a mouse. And, if the mouse could not be a composition of matter, then
similarly it surely could not be an art, process, machine, or manufacture, placing it
outside all the statutory categories.
One finds a surprising strain of vitalism in this opinion—in considering the proper
definition of “composition of matter,” the Court dwells on the transcendence of “higher”
life forms, arguing that the common understanding of “matter” does not capture this
transcendent quality.8 The court all but argues that the mouse has a soul; at least it asserts
that the common understanding of the term “matter” would be that it lacks whatever vital
spark a mouse has. As a consequence, given that a “composition of matter” cannot be
alive, the Court concluded that only a new act of the legislature—presumably, using a
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different terminology—could bring genetically modified higher organisms within the
scope of the statute.
In other words, the ultimate rationale behind this conclusion was that a particular
technology, such as genetically modified living subject matter—or at least, multicellular
genetically modified subject matter—must be within the contemplation of the legislature
when enacting the statute, rather than within the ambit of the language chosen by the
legislature. The import of such a holding for patent policy is striking. It effectively means
that the patentable subject matter canon is closed, reasoning that if the legislature did not
envision a particular technology when enacting a statute, it can only mean that
unanticipated innovation is not patentable. According to the majority in Harvard College,
only if Parliament indicated acceptance of a new category could an invention such as a
genetically modified mouse become eligible for patenting.
As I have pointed out in previous work9, this result is particularly striking because
two decades earlier, the US Supreme Court considered essentially the same question, but
reached a diametrically opposite result in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,10 the first American
case to squarely address the patenting of living organisms. The Chakrabarty decision
concerned a patent application covering a genetically engineered microorganism capable
of digesting petroleum. Most of the arguments on either side of the Chakrabarty decision
paralleled those that either supported or opposed the patent in Harvard College. But most
surprisingly, the courts in each case were interpreting the identical statutory language,
because the subject matter provisions of the Canadian patent statute were lifted almost
verbatim from the US statute.
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As with the Canadian statute, the US patent statute also states as its subject matter
new and useful processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of
matter.11 But unlike the Canadian statute, the US understanding of these terms extends to
living organisms. According to the US Supreme Court, the bacterium at issue in
Chakrabarty, being composed of matter, clearly qualified as a composition of matter
under the statute. The Court adopted the very straightforward position that bacteria,
whatever their properties as organisms, are composed of matter, and that term as used in
the statute includes technologies not specifically foreseen by the legislature. This
conclusion was informed by a policy conclusion somewhat contrary to that of the
Canadian court: that the US Congress in choosing the language of the statute had
intended patentable subject matter to encompass “anything under the sun made by man,”
consequently the language must be read expansively.12 On the American view, the
subject matter categories might be viewed as illustrative, or at least broadly inclusive.
In fact, unless one is possessed by the vitalism that seems to have gripped the
Canadian Supreme Court in the Harvard College case, it is fairly difficult to identify
items in the modern world that do not fit into one or more of the four categories of
process, machine, composition of matter, or article of manufacture. For example, in
addition to the Chakrabarty bacterium being a composition of matter, one could easily
imagine drafting claims by which such a recombinant bacterium might also constitute an
article of manufacture, given that it was the object of human processing, produced in a
laboratory. Similarly, one might envision a creative set of claims under which the
bacterium could be claimed as a machine—molecular biologists view various microbial

11
12

35 U.S.C. §101 (2011).
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952)).
7

structures as molecular machines, including nanoscale electrical motors, flywheels, and
driveshafts that drive bacterial flagella.13 Indeed, much of current nanotechnology is
based on the mechanics of molecular assemblies originating in microorganisms.
For that matter, claims to the Chakrabarty invention need not necessarily be
confined to the “product” categories of machine, composition, or manufacture. One could
imagine the bacterium being claimed in terms of its processes—although product patents
and process patents are generally placed into separate categories, living organisms in fact
constitute a discrete set of biological processes. On this view, Chakrabarty’s bacterium
comprised a large bag of biochemical reactions, if you will, and could likely be
distinguished in terms of such characteristics. It may be that as a practical matter such a
characterization would be too onerous as a claims-drafting exercise. But the implication
of such a thought exercise is that the Supreme Court’s reading of the statutory subject
matter categories as illustrative and inclusive largely transforms the subject matter
question into a descriptive problem.
There is of course a critical policy consideration animating the US Supreme
Court’s reading of the statute, which is a prescription remarkably different from the
Canadian approach in Harvard College Each court read essentially identical language,
and purported to defer to the legislative meaning of that language, to reach diametrically
opposite defaults: in one case that the categories of subject matter were intended to be
open to unforeseen innovation, in the other that the categories were intended to be closed.
In other words, the US Supreme Court held that the door to new technologies was open
unless Congress explicitly shuts it; the Canadian Supreme Court held that the door to new
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technologies is shut unless Parliament explicitly opens it.14 The implication for our
analysis here is that the former position invites new readings of the subject matter
categories, whereas the latter position precludes them.

A. Describing Biotechnology Inventions
But the Harvard College decision was short-lived, at least in its practical effect; within
two years the Canadian Supreme Court negated its previous opinion, albeit without
directly overruling it. In the subsequent Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser15 opinion,
the subject matter restrictions of Harvard College were undermined and perhaps entirely
undone, even though the particular holding of the opinion was retained. The Schmeiser
case again concerned the patentability of a living, multicellular organism, this time in the
form of a genetically modified plant. The plant in question was a patented recombinant
canola plant that was resistant to the herbicide glyphosphate; the herbicide was marketed
by Monsanto under the brand name “Round-Up,” making the plants “Round-Up Ready.”
Monsanto alleged that a farmer, Percy Schmeiser, had been growing such “Round-Up
Ready” plants without a license from Monsanto, in violation of the Monsanto patent.
Schmeiser argued at trial that he was unaware of the presence of the patented
plants in his fields, and did not know how they came to be growing there. It is fairly clear
that neither the trial court nor subsequent appellate courts believed this assertion, finding
contrary evidence that the plants were in Schmeiser’s fields intentionally. Schmeiser’s
level of intent or knowledge may have made little difference to the infringement analysis,
as intentional or not, making using or selling a patented invention constitutes violation of
14
15
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the patent statute as a matter of strict liability, and requires no scienter. So before the
Canadian Supreme Court, Schmeiser argued that Monsanto’s patent could not be proper
under the subject matter criteria articulated in the Harvard College case: the genetically
modified plant was clearly a multicellular, “higher” organism with complexity equivalent
to a genetically modified mouse. If the Canadian patent statute does not cover living
organisms, so that it does not cover transgenic mice, surely it does not include transgenic
plants either.
The Court rejected this argument, albeit in a somewhat circuitous fashion. In the
interim between Harvard College and Schmeiser, the Court had undergone a shift in
personnel; the Schmeiser opinion was decided by a new majority, written by a Justice
who had dissented in Harvard College, over the dissent of the Justice who had written the
majority opinion in Harvard College. The Schmeiser majority, while acknowledging that
the court had previously held higher organisms to be unpatentable, observed that the
claims in the Monsanto patent were directed to a particular recombinant DNA sequence
that conferred herbicide resistance. The Harvard College opinion had said nothing about
the exclusion of DNA molecules from patentable subject matter. Thus the court reasoned
that the Monsanto patent was not precluded by the Harvard College decision.
By permitting the “Round Up Ready” plant to be patented as a practical matter by
means of a claim to a constituent transgenic DNA sequence, the Schmeiser opinion
avoided expressly overruling Harvard College but instead limited it to insignificance.
True, the DNA claimed in the patent happened to be present in the plant, but it was not
the plant itself that was claimed. This formalism propagates a version of the Chakrabarty
description exercise above. After Schmeiser, clearly the path to patenting a plant, or a
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mouse, or any other “higher” organism in Canada is to draft the claims in terms of the
genetic modification, not in terms of the host embodying the modification. The Harvard
College prohibition thus becomes no more than a prohibition on terminology.

B. Expression and Function
Crossing now over the Atlantic, the conceptual thread that begins with Harvard College
takes on yet an additional twist in the more recent opinion of the Court of Justice of the
European Union in Monsanto v. Cefetra.16 This case concerned once again Monsanto’s
herbicide resistance “Round-Up Ready” technology. However, this time the genetically
modified plants were soy, rather than canola, and were grown in Argentina, a country
where Monsanto held no patent on the herbicide-resistant plant.
Patents are national in effect, and no patent owner holds patents to an invention in
every possible jurisdiction. Because the transgenic soy beans at issue in the case had been
grown in Argentina, no patent infringement occurred in the use of the plant there. The
beans were then ground into soymeal, which was imported into the European Union
through Rotterdam. Monsanto did hold a Dutch “Round Up Ready” patent, but of course
it was not the plant that was being imported: it was a processed product derived from the
plant.
However, as in the Schmeiser case, the Monsanto patent claims were drafted in
terms of the recombinant DNA sequence. Monsanto asserted that the DNA sequence was
present in the ground soymeal, so that importation of the meal constituted importation of
the sequence, violating its patent. In particular, Monsanto argued that the patent was
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drawn to protect the DNA sequences as such, not in meal or in a plant or any other
particularized context.
The importers alleged that this claim was improper under the European
Biotechnology Directive, an EU requirement to which the patent law of member states—
including the Netherlands—must conform. Article 9 of the European Biotechnology
Directive provides:
The protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or consisting
of genetic information shall extend to all material, save as provided in
Article 5(1), in which the product is incorporated and in which the genetic
information is contained and performs its function.17
Recital 23 of the directive additionally provides that:
. . . a mere DNA sequence without indication of a function does not
contain any technical information and is therefore not a patentable
invention.18
Interpreting the Biotechnology Directive, the Court of Justice of the European
Union rejected the assertion of the patent against the DNA in the soymeal. The Court
took the inverse proposition of Article 9 as limiting biotechnology patents: protection
shall not extend to material in which the genetic information does not perform its
function. The DNA sequence, although present in the soymeal, was clearly not
performing its function, as the material in which it was situated was dead. Even if the
patent were properly read under Dutch law to cover the DNA sequence as found in the
meal, this reading would conflict with the language of the Directive.
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The opinion distinguishes between DNA as “genetic information” and as
constituting “technical information,” which is to say, as enabling biological function. It
seems clear the language in the Directive serves to deter naked claims to DNA, by linking
molecular claims to a biological function.19 In the United States such claims have been
similarly limited, under the utility requirement for patentability, by requiring disclosure
of the biological function of the gene to which the patent is directed.20 Because the rate of
discovery for DNA sequences far outpaces their characterization, absent such limitations,
claims to isolated DNA molecules could be advanced long before their biological
function is known, preempting later beneficial applications of the molecule.
However, the Cefetra opinion extends this restriction to create a functional
limitation on DNA product claims. This not only assumes that the biological function of
the process is known and disclosed, it ties DNA product claims to a particular process
implementation.21 By limiting DNA claims to a functional milieu, nucleotides become
patentable only as part of a larger biological apparatus. This mirrors the rationale of
decisions concerning software in the context of digital processing apparatus,22 a parallel
line of precedent to which we now turn.
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II. SUBJECT MATTER EXCLUSIONS
As we have seen above, nearly everything “under the sun made by man,” if properly
described, potentially fits into one or another of the American subject matter categories.
This realization leaves one to wonder if there are items that, even if described so as to fit
one or more of the statutory categories, are not “made by man” and so might be excluded
from patentable subject matter. In fact patent law, both in Europe and America, deploys a
series of doctrines intended to winnow out patent candidates that are not inventions by
virtue of existing independent of, or perhaps prior to, human ingenuity. In the United
States these doctrines have been primarily addressed in a series of cases dealing with the
patentability of computer software.23 This developmental path may seem odd, given that
computer technology seems clearly a product of human engineering, and other
technologies such as biotechnology may seem drawn from natural materials. However, as
process-based inventions, digital processors implement general principles in a manner
that tends to implicate the division between the natural and the artificial.
Additionally, such software decisions are tightly coupled to the biotechnology
developments we have already explored. The relevant software cases begin with a trilogy
of opinions from the US Supreme Court, beginning in the 1970s. These cases are
contemporary with the Chakrabarty case, making their way through the US court system
at approximately the same time that the Chakrabarty case was wending its way to the
Supreme Court. Chakrabarty followed the first of the major software decisions,
Gottschalk v. Benson,24 and was initially remanded back to an intermediate court of
appeal for reconsideration in light of the second decision in the software trilogy, Parker
23
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v. Flook.25 The Chakrabarty opinion was in turn heavily relied upon in the subsequent
decision on software in Diamond v. Diehr.26 Notwithstanding the different subject matter,
Chakrabarty was effectively part of the same contemporaneous discourse as the
Gottschalk, Flook, and Diehr decisions.
The earliest of these Supreme Court decisions, the Gottschalk case, involved a
method or “algorithm” for converting one type of numerical notation into a different type
of numerical notation. The algorithm involved application of a particular mathematical
procedure to convert the numerical notation; the court characterized patenting the
algorithm as tantamount to patenting a mathematical procedure. As previous
commentators have noted, Gottschalk lay at the confluence of several concatenated patent
doctrines dealing with subject matter: the laws of nature doctrine, the abstract ideas
doctrine, the mental steps doctrine, and the printed matter doctrine.27 Each of these
closely related, judicially created doctrines serves to restrict the subject matter categories
articulated in the statute.
The first of these, figuring prominently in the opinion, is the prohibition against
patenting laws or principles of nature. Among the possible exceptions to the very broad
categories encompassed by the language of the American and Canadian patent statutes
are items that exist independent of, or perhaps prior to human invention. If the Court in
Chakrabarty held that anything under the sun made by man falls within patentable
subject matter, this implies the inverse that items under the sun not made by man do not
fall within patentable subject matter. Although there is no statutory language to this
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effect, the Court has at times held that laws and principles of nature, such as the theory of
relativity, as well as naturally occurring items such as “a mineral discovered in the earth
or a new plant found in the wild”28 constitute unpatentable products of nature.
But this prohibition rests on the somewhat philosophically dubious proposition
that what we label “natural law” originates, not from human invention or ingenuity, but
as a feature of the material world, preceding human perception. The Gottschalk opinion
equates mathematical procedures with laws of nature, extending the prohibition on
patenting the latter to a prohibition on the former. One might of course question whether
mathematics is in some sense constitutive of natural law, somehow embedded in the
fabric of the universe, rather than constituting a human construct that is useful to describe
the universe.29 And regardless of one’s view on the natural state of mathematics, one
might question separately whether what we call natural law is not a product of human
formulation. Nonetheless, US patent law since Gottschalk assumes that mathematics, as
well as natural law, is somehow embedded in the fabric of the universe, waiting to be
discovered, andis not invented.
Acknowledging the laws of nature issue leads quickly to the second and related
doctrine at issue in the case: the prohibition on patenting abstract ideas. Black-letter
patent law has long prohibited the patenting of ideas that have not been reduced to some
specific instantiation.30 The relationship to the principles of nature doctrine is almost
immediately apparent: all patentable inventions are at some level based upon the
operation of natural law or principles. A description of the invention at this abstract level
frequently constitutes the idea or concept of the invention. Thus, claims that are not
28
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wedded to a fairly specific embodiment may be sufficiently imprecise to encompass the
principle of the invention rather than its implementation, and so encompass laws of
nature.
The abstract idea prohibition in turn raises a third problem. Although perhaps not
stated as explicitly as the other doctrines, the Gottschalk opinion indicated a concern with
the mental steps doctrine.31 Patent law has long resisted claims encompassing steps that
could be carried out in the human mind. To some extent, such claims simply raise
practical problems of enforcement: if mental activity were covered by exclusive legal
rights, it would be difficult to detect, police, assess, or prove infringement when someone
is thinking patented thoughts. The very concept of exclusive rights in mental processes
raises in turn related concerns regarding encroachment on freedom of speech and
thought. Such concerns might not seem implicated by processes carried out in a digital
computer. But to the extent that computers were in the 1970s and early 1980s viewed as
“electronic brains,” some correspondence was seen between operations in carbon
memory and operations in silicon memory. And, human cognitive processes might be
implicated by broad undifferentiated claims including steps that could be carried out in
either silicon or carbon memory, which is to say in a constructed data processor or in the
human brain.
Fourth, following from the mental steps doctrine is an inevitable concern
regarding the “printed matter doctrine.”32 Patent law has tended to reject as unpatentable
any claims where the novelty of the invention lies in the arrangement of symbolic indicia.
As a practical matter, this prohibition helps to police the boundary between patent and
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copyright, preventing patents on novel arrangements of symbols that constitute literary or
artistic works. But symbolic indicia are of course largely constitutive of software: humanreadable indicia at the level of source code, machine-readable indicia at the level of
object code. Software is inscribed in magnetic and optical media, and encoded in
electronic circuits. The power of computing technology is that it is quite literally
inscribed with writing, so that anything that can be described can be modeled in a data
processor.33 Thus, patent claims involving software or recorded data tend to blur the line
between function and expression; claims encompassing encoded functional operations
could just as well read on recorded texts or music.34

A. Tangible Inventions
In a follow-on case, Parker v. Flook, the US Supreme Court held that software that was
used to calculate the parameters for an industrial process was not patentable; a numerical
“alarm limit” calculation, used to monitor the state of an industrial process, was held too
abstract to meet the tests for subject matter.35 But the outcome was decidedly different in
the third case the Court took during its twentieth-century run of software decisions,
Diamond v. Diehr.36 This opinion, citing repeatedly to Chakrabarty, held that an
industrial process for curing rubber was sufficiently concrete to garner a patent, even
though the process involved the use of a chemical equation in a digital processor to
perform calculations that determined the timing of the process. The difference between
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Diehr and Flook appeared to rest largely on the palpability of the end product of the
claimed process. In Flook it was a number, but in Diehr the output was a concrete,
tangible, and useful result—that is, cured rubber.
The approval of software claims grounded in “concrete” and “tangible”
embodiments ushered in an era of what Professors Lemley and Cohen have called the
“doctrine of the magic words.”37 For the next two decades, the Patent Office and lower
courts in the United States struggled with the problem of when a claim constituted a
claim to software, and when it constituted a Diehr-type claim to software
implementation. Patent applicants and their attorneys drafted what were effectively
software claims in terms of apparatus, engaging in much the same subject matter exercise
illustrated above with regard to the Chakrabarty bacterium: How many statutory subject
matter categories could claims for a software invention be drafted to fit?
The most obvious characterization of software is of course the statutory category
of process, as computer code implements a series of electromechanical transformations
with a specified output. However, given that “algorithm” is very nearly synonymous with
“process,” and Gottschalk largely disparaged the patenting of algorithms, the logical
category for software became suspect. Diehr permitted claims to a type of algorithm, but
seemingly only as embodied in mechanism, not pure process claims. But this of course
points to a second statutory categorization; because the language of Diehr ostensibly
valorized software in the context of apparatus claims, many software claims oriented
toward characterization as a machine.
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Thus a potential alternative was to claim software as a machine. As some
commentators struggling with software in the copyright context have noted, software
constitutes a machine built of text.38 But this is of course precisely the characteristic that
runs afoul of the printed matter doctrine. Hence, machine-based claims were drafted in
terms of the state of the hardware, as configured by software. In a similar vein, yet
another alternative was to attempt to describe software as an article of manufacture: for
example to claim semiconductor chips inscribed with novel code, or in the now-infamous
patent application in In re Beauregard, to claim a floppy disc incorporating novel
magnetic flux.39 After some resistance, the Patent Office grudgingly agreed to accept
such claims, although it is worth noting that recent decisions have limited the use of such
claims by examining the patentability of the underlying encoded process.40
The overall consequence of the Gottschalk decision was that securing allowance
of software claims became fundamentally a claims-drafting problem. Claims were
couched in terminology either to obscure the presence of software entirely, or to describe
it in a way palatable to the examiner’s degree of adherence to the cases interpreting the
subject matter provisions. This trend reached its apex with the now-infamous Federal
Circuit decision in State Street Bank, holding that any invention that produced a
“concrete, tangible, useful result” fell within patentable subject matter41—but “concrete”
and “tangible” appear to have been metaphors, as the Federal Circuit approved as
concrete and tangible results such as numerical output, which was expressly disapproved
by the Supreme Court in Gottschalk and Flook.
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And it is critical to note, with regard to composition of software patents, that
several of the limiting doctrines identified in Gottschalk might themselves be viewed as
inchoate products of indefinite claims drafting and inadequate disclosure. For example,
one view of the prohibition against claiming laws of nature is that such claims violate the
requirements of enablement, commensurability, and written description. The patentee
cannot claim multiple instantiations of an invention unless she has enabled and described
those instantiations, but claiming abstractions or principles of nature inevitably
encompasses embodiments that are not enabled or described. Conversely, claims that are
insufficiently imprecise might encompass the principle of an invention rather than its
implementation, and so encompass laws of nature. Likewise, mental steps are almost by
definition difficult to describe and enable.
This view of descriptive inadequacy certainly was the position taken by the
Federal Circuit in State Street, dealing with business methods.42 American patent
jurisprudence has displayed a fairly strong historical bias against business method
patents, many of which have traditionally involved mental steps or printed matter.
Business methods became a recurring issue in software cases; once software patents are
allowed, it is inevitable that some software will be directed to accounting or investment
or inventory or other business methods. But the Federal Circuit opined that there was in
fact no prohibition or animus against business methods; rather, that the cases disfavoring
business methods had simply invalidated specific patents that failed enablement and
claim definiteness—which happened to involve business methods.
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B. In Search of the Technical
Such issues were of course not confined to the United States; software patents are sought
in other jurisdictions as well. On the other side of the Atlantic, the European patent
systems were confronting much the same set of problems.43 There has not been and is not
at the time of this writing a pan-European patent; consequently a significant portion of
this jurisprudence evolved in the context of diverse national court decisions.44 Those
from Germany and the United Kingdom are particularly notable in their distinctive
approaches to software as patentable subject matter.45
Because a complete review of such decisions would exceed the limits imposed by
this volume’s editors (and perhaps the patience of the audience, as well), I will focus here
on decisions rendered by the appellate boards of the European Patent Office. The EPO is
charged with examining applications under the provisions of the multilateral European
Patent Convention (EPC). The EPC contains explicit treaty prohibitions addressing most
of the judicially created doctrines at issue in Gottschalk. Article 52(2) of the EPC
excludes from patentable subject matter:
(a)

discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;

(b)

aesthetic creations;

(c)

schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or
doing business, and programs for computers;
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(d)

presentations of information.46

On its face the provision might seem to end the question of patents for computer
programs, as the treaty is explicit about excluding them from patentable subject matter.
However, Article 52(3) adds a troubling caveat: that the enumerated categories are only
excluded from patentable subject matter “as such.”47 This leaves the troubling question as
to what could be meant by a computer program “as such”—that is, a computer program
as a computer program and not as something else.
Answering that question has produced, much as in the United States, two to three
decades’ worth of uncertainty and turmoil over software patenting. The EPO has focused
on whether an invention as claimed has some type of “technical” nature, which the
Article 52 categories such as business methods and computer programs “as such” have
been said to lack. Various tests have evolved to assay the technical character of
suspicious claims. Initially the EPO looked for inventions to make a “technical
contribution” to the art, that is, to have some inventive aspect outside the software.48
Later this was amended to look for inventions having a “technical effect,” that is, some
concrete output.49 More recently even this approach was abandoned to allow any claim
involving hardware to come within patentable subject matter.50
The parallels between these approaches and those in the contemporary
Gottschalk/Flook/Diehr trilogy are apparent, as are the attendant pitfalls. As the suspect
Article 52 categories frequently are implemented in computing apparatus, it becomes
extremely difficult to determine when a computer program, business method, or even a
46
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game has a technical character. The result has been the EPO’s version of the “doctrine of
the magic words,” by which software patents passed the scrutiny of the examining corps
so long as certain suspect terminology was avoided. The attempt to distinguish technical
character has produced largely rhetorical stratagems: decades of patent applications
concerning software, whose claims were drafted in terms of hardware or apparatus so that
the claims would not be drawn to a computer program as a computer program.
The issue is well bracketed by two decisions of the Technical Board of Appeal of
the European Patent Office that concern business methods implemented in computer
technologies. The first of these is the Pension Benefits decision, which considered an
automated system of investment—that is to say, a business method.51 The claims of the
patent were drawn to both the method of investment and an apparatus implementing the
method. Reviewing the application, the Board opined that a technical character is
inherent in the EPC concept of invention, and that merely reciting computing means
within a method claim does not confer a technical character on a claimed process
invention. At the same time, an apparatus claim to a suitably programmed data
processing device would constitute patentable subject matter, rendering the claimed
invention patentable subject matter. However the method claims in the patent were
rejected as lacking a technical nature.
A later decision, Hitachi,52 in some respects supports and in others contradicts the
Pension Benefit outcome. The patent application in Hitachi claimed an automated system
of auctioning; again, from a categorical perspective, the invention constituted both a
computer program and a business method, and was described in an application
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encompassing both apparatus and process claims. Following the Pension Benefits
reasoning, the Board’s decision again held that the implementation of the invention in
hardware, by virtue of incorporating the apparatus, clearly presented a claim with a
technical nature. However, unlike the Pension Benefits decision, the Board held the
method claims as executed by means of a physical apparatus to also entail a technical
nature.
Each of these decisions takes the position that by reciting an apparatus claim
implementing the method, the method characterized as hardware comes within patentable
subject matter, and no longer constitutes a program “as such.” This is essentially a
version of the drafting techniques already discussed for the United States following
Diamond v. Diehr. The opinions part ways with regard to the permissibility of method
claims as method claims. But both cases then deny the applicant a patent for failure of an
inventive step, holding that given the invention, implementation in a general purpose data
processor is obvious.
This approach is logically somewhat suspect due to what American courts would
term “hindsight reconstruction”; that is, taking the invention as given when assessing its
own inventiveness. Such an approach comes very close to the discredited analysis of
Parker v. Flook, which considered an abstract method as its implementation’s own prior
art.53 But notwithstanding the questionable logic of the inventive step analysis, the overall
outcome of the cases may chart the most pragmatic and productive route for questions
involving problematic technologies. Rather than struggle with intractable subject matter
questions, the decisions concede that interminable, unwinnable fight; grant the method
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patentable subject matter status; and instead hold firm on the patentability questions of
utility, novelty, and obviousness. This approach was unfortunately rejected by the US
Supreme Court when recently urged by the Obama administration as a sensible resolution
to subject matter confusion.54 But the EPO decisions may chart a path to a more sensible
subject matter jurisprudence.
Or perhaps they will not. It is worth noting that the President of the EPO, perhaps
in response to the invitation of a British court attempting to fathom the EPO case
decisions,55 convened an enlarged Board to reconcile the disparity between the approach
typified by Hitachi and that typified by Pension Benefits.56 After spending considerable
time with the problem, the Board declined to do so, issuing an opinion that some
variation was inevitable in developing technologies. Given that the technology, and the
problems associated with claiming, have been developing for a good thirty years, it is
difficult to understand how much more development is needed before a coherent
approach could be articulated.

III. PROCESS AND APPARATUS
The subject matter themes found in biotechnology and software cases converge in a
series of recent disputes over patents for diagnostic tests. These cases combine the
recurring questions we have seen regarding principles of nature, mental steps, abstract
ideas, and subject matter categories. Although these process inventions frequently
involve some biological molecule, sometimes including DNA or another nucleic acid,
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and may be automated, employing some type of digital processor, the doctrinal
convergence is due to more than a technological convergence. The method claims at issue
in such cases involve biological rather than electronic processes, but implicate the same
set of doctrines and policies.
The commonality is largely a product of the form of the claims at issue more than
of the particular technology involved. The most troublesome diagnostic claims have been
directed to minimalist versions of test procedures, seemingly relatively low-tech
processes centered on drawing a biological sample and performing simple chemical
analysis, possibly by hand. Rather than reciting a specific apparatus they claim the steps
of testing and diagnosis simpliciter. Consequently, as in the software controversy over
mental steps, these claims do not distinguish whether the procedure is to be performed in
silicon or carbon data processors, and they are concomitantly broad enough to encompass
the idea or principle on which the test is based.
Claims of this type were at issue in Labcorp v. Metabolite,57 where the diagnostic
process claims at issue involved a “correlation” step—that is, testing for the presence of a
certain substance in the blood of a patient, and deciding on the basis of the concentration
of that substance whether the patient was ill. This case was originally accepted for review
by the US Supreme Court, then dismissed as having been improvidently granted review.58
Justice Breyer, dissenting from the dismissal order, indicated in a lengthy opinion his
discomfort with such patents as possibly encompassing laws of nature—that is, the
relationship between a certain metabolite and disease—and possibly encompassing a
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“mental step” in the doctor’s recognition of disease from a test result.59 Breyer urged
review of the case or a similar case in order to reign in subject matter overreaching.
Breyer’s commentary signaled to lower courts the likelihood of Supreme Court action on
the topic, and is widely credited with moving the inferior Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit away from its permissive “useful concrete tangible result” test for
patentability.
Nonetheless, similar patents continued to issue, and the Supreme Court took up
this series of questions in the Mayo v. Prometheus60 decision, another diagnostic method
case. The method claims in the patent held by Prometheus were drawn to the process of
measuring the levels of certain metabolites in a patient’s blood after administering
thiopurine drugs, and then adjusting the dosage to avoid either an ineffectively low or
harmfully high dosage. As in Metabolite, the patent was challenged on the ground that its
claims were essentially drawn to laws of nature, that is, to the relationship between the
level of metabolites in the patient’s blood and the efficacy of the drug dosage.
Additionally, also as in Metabolite, the claims included a “determining” step that could
have been characterized as an impermissible mental step.
The court focused on the “principle of nature” argument, relying on the reasoning
from the Diehr and Flook software decisions to emphasize that processes consisting
largely or entirely of physical correlations, without some significant physical apparatus or
application, lie outside patentable subject matter. The Federal Circuit had opined that the
claims met this standard because they involved a “transformation” of matter in vivo,
which is to say that the drug administered to the patient metabolized in the body to the
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substances measured. But the Supreme Court viewed metabolic transformation itself as
merely the product of natural biological processes, and inconsequential in limiting claims
to the process of gathering data from which physicians could draw an inference about the
patient’s treatment. The Court particularly emphasized that broad method claims of this
type could preclude use of the underlying principle, potentially inhibiting future research
or advancement based on the principle.
The commonalities between the software cases and the diagnostic cases are not
limited to the appearance of the laws of nature or mental steps doctrines. The printed
matter doctrine has reared its head in the diagnostic cases as well, as for example in the
King Pharmaceuticals v. Eon Labs61 decision from the Federal Circuit. The claims in the
contested King patent concerned a method of administering a pharmaceutical orally with
food, which was shown to increase the efficacy of the drug. There was nothing new about
the drug or its use in treatment, or oral administration. For that matter, people had long
taken the drug with food, but had done so to avoid an upset stomach, rather than to
increase the efficacy of the drug. The only new aspect of the method was informing or
encouraging the patient to take the drug with food for enhanced efficacy. Thus, the claims
of the method of treatment patent at issue were drawn to either verbally informing the
patient of the positive effects of administering the drug with food, or communicating this
information to the patient by means of a printed label on the drug container.
The most recent chapter in this ongoing story is found in the American court
decisions involving the so-called Myriad gene patents, Association for Molecular
Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office,62 a case that as of this writing is
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pending before the US Supreme Court.63 The lawsuit is contemporary with the Bilski,
Prometheus, and King lawsuits, moving through the court system in parallel with those
decisions. The AMP lawsuit concerns claims to genetic sequences, and to diagnostic
procedures employing the gene sequences, for BRCA-1 and BRCA-2, which confer on
carriers of the genes a heightened risk of breast cancer.64 Both the product patent claims
directed to the nucleotides and the process patent claims directed to using the sequences
were challenged as encompassing unpatentable laws or products of nature.65
The Myriad product claims included different types of molecules with different
relationships to naturally occurring DNA. The patent claimed both “isolated and purified”
genomic (gDNA) sequences, as well as complementary (cDNA) sequences, that are
reverse transcribed from messenger RNA (mRNA) transcripts drawn from human cells.
The genomic sequences were a particular target of the “products of nature” argument, as
their nucleotide sequences were drawn from those found in the human body. However,
relying on several decades of precedential practice from the USPTO, Myriad argued that
the limitation in the claim to “isolated and purified” sequences set them apart from
naturally occurring DNA. The DNA sequences as found in human somatic cells are
surrounded by and bound to an array of other macromolecules, making the isolated
sequence a product of human intervention that is not naturally occurring.
Myriad further argued that, even if the claims to isolated genomic DNA read on
products of nature, the patent claims to cDNA did not. cDNA does not normally exist in
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human cells, being the product of a laboratory reverse transcription procedure using
mRNA transcripts as a template, read by a special type of viral enzyme that will assemble
a DNA strand complementary to the RNA.66 As a result, cDNAs typically have structural
and coding differences from genomic human DNA; in particular, they are missing long
“intervening sequences” or “introns” that are not transcribed into mRNA, and so are not
present in the reverse transcribed cDNA.67 Transcription from RNA to DNA does not
normally occur in human cells, so that the claimed cDNAs were fairly clearly the product
of human intervention.
However the trial court held both types of DNA molecules, cDNA and gDNA,
unpatentable, reasoning that they contained the same “information” as a native DNA
strand, which is to say that they contained essentially the same coding sequence.68 As the
“physical embodiment of genetic information,” the trial judge found them to constitute
products of nature rather than products of human invention. The court additionally held
Myriad’s process claims, drawn to the use of the genes in diagnosis, to be unpatentable
on much the same grounds as the Supreme Court later articulated for invalidating the
Prometheus diagnostic claims. The process claims recited a method for assessing the
relationship of particular nucleotide sequences to the risk of breast cancer, without
specifying any particular apparatus or embodiment. This, the court reasoned was
tantamount to patenting a natural principle: the correlation between the presence of
certain DNA variants in the body, and the risk of developing breast cancer.69
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On appeal to the Federal Circuit, and again subsequently on remand to the Federal
Circuit from a brief sojourn at the Supreme Court, a three-judge panel unanimously
upheld the trial judge’s holdings with regard to the Myriad diagnostic claims,
unanimously reversed the trial judge’s holding regarding cDNA, and reversed by a
majority the holding regarding gDNA.70 The panel all agreed that the process claims
encompassed abstract laws of nature, and all agreed that cDNAs are the patentable
product of human intervention, but split regarding the “product of nature” claims for
gDNA.
In fact, even the majority of the panel was in many senses a plurality, reflecting a
three-way division of opinion as to how to think about the genomic DNA claims. Judge
Bryson, in dissent, fully embraced the trial court’s characterization of the genomic
sequence DNA as an unpatentable natural product.71 Judge Lourie, writing for the
majority, reached his conclusions by focusing primarily on the structure of the gDNA
molecules, noting that the nucleotide chains, having been separated from their native
environment of the chromosome, have a different chemical structure than the same
sequences as found in human cells.72 Judge Moore, in concurrence, reached the same
conclusions, but by focusing primarily on the function of the gDNA, noting that the
DNAs claimed in the patent could be used for a variety of purposes that a native molecule
could not.73
The interplay between the district and appellate courts in AMP echoes and
reprises certain themes recognizable from the computer software cases. Aside from the
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familiar “principle of nature” treatment of the diagnostic method claims, much of the
discussion hinges on the proper categorical treatment of information-based inventions.
Indeed, the discourse among the appellate judges, and between the appellate and trial
judges, can be seen as a disagreement over “technical character” in a different context.
Although the appellate decision is divided on the question of gDNA patentability, its
unanimity on the question of cDNA was tantamount to a unanimous rejection of the trial
court’s equation of cDNA and gDNA as equivalently entailing the same informational
content. And with regard to the patentability of gDNA, one might say that the appellate
majority largely focused on the apparatus, that is, on either the structure or the function of
the molecule, rather than on its coding sequence.

CONCLUSION
It is impossible to trace the trajectory of these cases without being struck by the multiple
intricate cross-connections. The issues raised by biotechnology and software patenting
cross both technological and jurisdictional boundaries. It may come as something of a
surprise that Gottschalk and Diehr can only be properly read in the context of
Chakrabarty, or that Hitachi and Pension Benefits are best understood in tandem with
Monsanto v. Cefetra. But what may be more surprising is that full comprehension of the
ramifications of the Cefetra decision requires the context provided by AMP and
Schmeiser, or that the reasoning of Hitachi and Pension Benefits tracks both Gottschalk
and AMP.
Reading such cases together demonstrates the recurrent doctrinal pattern in both
biotechnology and software subject matter decisions. First, in comparing the cases
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reviewed here, it should be apparent that the doctrines invoked in such cases—laws of
nature, abstract ideas, mental steps, printed matter—not only substantially overlap with
one another but are frequently indistinguishable from one another, blurring across a
doctrinal gradient: patent claims that are too abstract run the risk of capturing within their
ambit a law of nature; claims that encompass mental steps are too abstract; claims that
encompass symbolic indicia may read on mental steps. Hence these doctrines travel in a
pack, appearing en masse in the patent decisions addressing biotechnology and software.
The effect of these doctrines, as shown above, is to transform the subject matter problem
in biotechnology and software patents into a drafting problem. Language that seems
sufficiently concrete, avoiding abstractions or conceptual claiming, will tend to skirt the
around the limiting doctrines. Conversely, the prohibitions against software or
biotechnology in certain forms shunt claims drafting toward descriptions that encompass
familiar and permissible statutory categories (machines, articles of manufacture,
compositions of matter), and away from process-based claims. These acceptable
categories are all product categories, and so necessarily tied to a particular physical
substrate. And of course process claims, being largely conceptual, are most acceptable
when described in terms of some physical apparatus.
The appearance of these doctrinal patterns in contexts that cross technological and
jurisdictional boundaries allows us to observe not merely doctrinal similarities, but to
excavate the underpinnings of such similarities. A key insight is the presence of
informational claims, as acknowledged in cases such as AMP and Cefetra.74 At some
level all technology involves the embodiment of information; to a greater or lesser extent
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all artifacts carry information encoded in technical structures.75 This is sometimes easily
apparent, as in the case of a mechanical lock and key, and sometimes less apparent. Even
artifacts whose informational encoding is not immediately recognizable entail
informational content, as thermodynamically defined.76
But where classic mechanical, electrical, or chemical inventions were concerned,
this aspect of their character could largely be ignored or overlooked. Indeed, because
description and specification of informational content is relatively recent and often
imprecise, patent law proceeding out of the nineteenth century developed an antipathy
toward informational characterizations, leaning instead toward definition of inventive
artifacts in terms of more readily observable physical attributes.77 We have seen in the
reviewed cases above this tropism, across subject matter categories, toward definition by
means of physical characteristics.
However, the informational character of process-based inventions is less
amenable to being ignored than that of product inventions. Processes, whether chemical,
mechanical, or electrical, necessarily implicate the transfer of information, as entropic
changes between physical vectors.78 Little wonder, then, that processes become suspect
subject matter for patents unless limited to the objects or subjects of such transfer. And
this antipathy extends to information-based technologies generally. As I have pointed out
in previous work, informational encoding is eminent in both macromolecules and
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computer devices, where informational content is only lightly embodied, and the
descriptive line between product and process is blurred.79
In sum, all the doctrines common to trans-Atlantic software and biotechnology
cases concern the disposition of information within patentable subject matter. Broad
abstract claims constitute claims to information or information transfer; mental steps
implicate the organic recording of information, just as printed matter necessarily
implicates the codification of information. Patent doctrine attempts to confine software
claims to a particular apparatus for data processing, or limit a DNA claim to the context
of a particular function, in an attempt to avoid the hard question of how to situate these
information technologies within a nineteenth-century legal framework. The cases
deploying these doctrines, in any jurisdiction, are difficult to parse, but the deficiency lies
not in the “problem” technologies they address. Rather the problem is in the capacity of
patent law to function in the information age. Until patent law develops some way to
accommodate information-based technologies, courts on both sides of the Atlantic will
continue to struggle to apply subject matter limitations.
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